Abstract-Certain families of graphs can be used to obtain multivariate polynomials for cryptographic algorithms. In particular, in this paper, we introduce stream ciphers based on nonbijective multivariate maps. The presented symmetric encryption algorithms are based on three families of bipartite graphs with partition sets isomorphic to K n , where K is selected as the finite commutative ring. The plainspace of the algorithm is
Abstract-Certain families of graphs can be used to obtain multivariate polynomials for cryptographic algorithms. In particular, in this paper, we introduce stream ciphers based on nonbijective multivariate maps. The presented symmetric encryption algorithms are based on three families of bipartite graphs with partition sets isomorphic to K n , where K is selected as the finite commutative ring. The plainspace of the algorithm is Ω = {x| xi ∈ K * , x ∈ K n } ⊂ K n , Ω ∼ = K * × K n−1 . We describe the algorithm for the case K = Z2m , m ≥ 2. In fact, we use the relation
to obtain encryption polynomial map of degree greater than or equal to d + 2 and decryption map of degree greater than or equal to d dec + 2. We assume d dec grows with the growth of parameter m, because this makes cryptanalysis very difficult task. Symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms for users are numerical recurrent processes, not requiring generation of encryption and decryption maps in their symbolic forms. They use arithmetical operations of addition, subtraction, and multiplication. That's why the algorithms are robust (execution speed is O(n)). To break the algorithm an adversary must use linearization attacks for recovering non-bijective "decryption map" of degree greater than d dec + 2 in its symbolic form. To achieve this, the adversary needs at least O(n d dec + 2) pairs of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext to restore the nonbijective map of degree greater than or equal to d dec + 2. We present tables for evaluation of execution time for m = 8 with various length of passwords and sizes of files. Computer simulations demonstrate good mixing properties of the encryption functions.
F EW graph based algorithms have been implemented since 1998 (see [1] - [25] ). So there is some history of the usage of sparse algebraic graphs in symmetric cryptographical algorithms. The following known graphs defined over finite commutative ring K were used: D(n, K) (see [1] , for K = F q graphs were defined and investigated in [26] , [27] ), W (n, K) (Wenger graphs defined in [28] ), graphs A(n, K) introduced in [45] and graphs D(n, K) of [25] . Popular choices of K are finite fields F 127 , F 2 7 , F 2 8 , F 2 16 and F 32 2 and rings modular arithmetics Z 2 7 , Z 2 8 , Z 2 16 . We present this research history in the next section.
In section 3 we introduce a class of bivariate graphs containg all the above mentioned graphs. Such concept is convenient for uniform description of encryption scheme and observation of common properties of graphs from this class (section 4). We compare graphs and related algorithms corresponding to different families (W (n, K), D(n, K), A(n, K) and D(n, K)) in section 5.
Here the reader can find remarks on multivariate cryptography and its connections with cryptographical applications of Algebraic Graph Theory.
RSA is one of the most popular cryptosystems. It is based on a number factorization problem and on Euler's Theorem. Peter Shor discovered that factorization problem can be effectively solved by using a theoretical quantum computer. It means that RSA could not be a security tool in the future postquantum era. One of the research directions leading to a postquantum secure public key is the Multivariate Cryptography which uses a polynomial maps of affine space K n defined over a finite commutative ring K into itself as encryption tools (see [29] ). This is a young promising research area because of the current lack of known cryptosystems with the proven resistance against attacks with the use of Turing machines. Other important direction of Postquantum Cryptography is the study of Hyperelliptic Curves Cryptosystems. We have to say that classical elliptic curves encryption will be not secure in the Postquantum era.
Applications of Algebraic Graph Theory to Multivariate
Cryptography were shown in our talks at Erdös Centennial (2013, Budapest) and Central European Conference on Cryptology 2014 (Alfred Renyi Institute, Budapest) [30] , [31] . Talks were devoted to algorithms based on bijective maps of affine spaces into itself. Applications of algebraic graphs to cryptography started with symmetric algorithms based on explicit constructions of extremal graph theory and their directed analogues (see survey [11] , [32] ). The main idea is to convert an algebraic graph in a finite automaton and to use the pseudorandom walks on the graph as encryption tools.
This approach can also be used for the key exchange protocols. Nowadays the idea of "symbolic walks" on algebraic graphs, when the walk on the graph depends on parameters given as special multivariate polynomials in variables depending from plainspace vector, appears in several public key cryptosystems. Another source of graphs suitable for cryptography is connected to finite geometries and their flag system (see [33] and further references).
Multivariate cryptography started from the study of potential for the special quadratic encryption multivariate bijective map of K n , where K is an extention of finite field F q of characteristic 2. One of the first such cryptosystems was proposed by Imai and Matsumoto and cryptanalysis for that system was invented by J. Patarin. A survey on various modifications of this algorithm and corresponding cryptanalysis can be found in [29] or [34] .
One of the first uses of non-bijective map of multivariate cryptography was in the oil and vinegar cryptosystem proposed in [35] and analyzed in [36] . Nowadays, this general idea is strongly supported by publication [37] devoted to security analysis of direct attacks on modified unbalanced oil and vinegar systems. It looks like such systems and rainbow signature schemes may lead to promising Public Key Schemes of Multivariate Encryption defined over finite fields. Nonbijective multivariate sparse encryption maps of degree 3 and ≥ 3 based on walks on algebraic graphs D(n, K) defined over general commutative ring and their homomorphic images were proposed in [38] . Security of the corresponding cryptosystem rests on the idea of hidden discrete logarithm problem. U. Romańczuk-Polubiec and V. Ustimenko combine an idea of "oil and vinegar signature cryptosystem" with the idea of linguistic graph-based map with partially invertible decomposition to introduce a new cryptosystem [38] . This algorithm can be implemented with the use of families D(n, K) and A(n, K) and natural homomorphism between them. Finally, in [39] "hidden RSA multivariate encryption" based on graphs D(n, K) were proposed.
In this paper we modify the encryption map (private key) of the above mentioned cryptosystem in terms of family of bivariate graphs defined over the commutative ring K. These maps have multivariate nature despite the "numerical implementation" in symmetric ciphers mode with the plainspace isomorphic to K * × K n−1 .
I. ON SOME IMPLEMENTATION OF ALGORITHMS BASED ON BIJECTIVE MAPS
We worked on a software package that allows us to investigate strongly symmetric cases of stream ciphers based on graphs W (n, K), D(n, K), D(n, K) and A(n, K), where K is the arithmetic ring. Some cases are already implemented by our team at the level of prototype model.
In very special cases the algorithms were previously implemented. The first implementation of D(n, K) encryption was done in 2000 at the University of South Pacific (USP, Fiji Islands). The research team was composed by Prof. V. Ustimenko, PhD Dharmendra Sharma (currently professor of University of Canberra), postgraduate students V. Gounder and R. Prasad (see [2] , [3] ). The work was supported by the University Research Committee of the University of South Pacific (USP) grant. The implementation of this case on asymmetric mode was discussed in [5] . The chosen case for K was F 127 , which is the closest prime number to the size of ASCII code alphabet. It means that one has to delete just the delete service symbol and can encrypt arbitrary files of type txt. The chosen string was α i (x) = x + d i , where d i are elements of chosen ring K = F 127 chosen in pseudorandom fashion. So that was a case of shifting encryption.
The affine transformations L 1 and L 2 were simply identities. Implemented cipher on ordinary PC was rather robust in performance, but with average mixing properties. It's been used at USP digital network working for campuses and USP centers located in 11 island countries of South Pacific region. The package was also used by ORACLE based system of the bursary office (see [8] ). Recently group of students from Okanagan college (affiliated with the University of British Columbia) implemented that stream cipher on a cluster network of PC's. It was used for a large data encryption [10] . The implementation of that security algorithm for protection of Geo Information Systems was described in [6] , [7] .
Another case for K = Z 256 and graph D(n, K) was implemented under the Research Committee of Sultan Qaboos University (SQU, Oman) grant. The research team was composed of professors Vasyl Ustimenko and Abderezak Tousane and students Rahma Al Habsi and Huda Al Naamani. The software uses one to one correspondence between element of Z 256 and symbols of binary alphabet. It allows encryption of various file types (with extension doc, jpg, htm, avi, pdf, . . . ) in a way that encrypted file is presented in the same format with the plaintext. The symmetric algorithm was used at academical networks of SQU and Kiev Mohyla Academy [9] , [10] .
The cases of D(n, K), where K is the finite field F 2 7 F 2 8 , F 2 16 , the shifting encryption was implemented and investigated in [20] .
The systematic study of shifting encryption for cases of shifting encryptions of D(n, K) was conducted at UMCS (Lublin, Poland). J. Kotorowicz used arithmetical rings Z [14] , [16] ). The encryption was essentially faster than in all previously known cases. The selected affine transformation leads to an encryption with very good mixing properties: the change of a single character of the plaintext or the change of a single character of the encryption string d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s causes the change of at least 98 percent of the ciphertext characters. In [23] these cases were implemented for graphs A(n, K) with very similar results on the mixing properties. In the case of τ R = τ L −1 it can be proved that the order of A(n, K) and D(n, K) based encryption map grows with the growth of parameter n. The comparison of orders was completed through the study of cycles structures of A(n, K) and D(n, K) encryptions. Results demonstrated similarity in both cases. 398 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDCSIS. POZNAŃ, 2018
M. Klisowski implemented D(n, K) and A(n, K) shifting encryption on symbolic level in the cases of finite fields [22] , [24] ). In [40] A. Wróblewska proved that shifting D(n, K) encryption is given by a cubical multivariate map. A similar result for A(n, K) based encryption was stated in [41] . Simulation results of [22] , [23] allow to estimate time of generation of these maps as functions of parameter n and densities of such multivariate cubic encryption and decryption maps. A comparison of cases A(n, K) and D(n, K) for the above fields an be found in [24] . Similar results for cases of Boolean rings of sizes 2 7 , 2 8 , 2 16 , 2 32 are obtained via computer simulations. The PhD Thesis of M. Klisowski [42] contains the first results on D(n, K) and A(n, K) based multivariate maps which are not defined via shifting encryptions. He used symbolic strings of kind
3 + c s with constants c i , i = 1, 2, . . . , s for special fields F q in which x 3 = b has unique solution. It was shown that such a choice makes direct linearization attacks impossible.
The first implementation for the case of Wenger graph based encryption was completed at the University of Sao Paolo (USP, Brasil) (see [12] and further references). Professors V. Futorny and V. Ustimenko chose field F 253 which size is the closest from below prime to the size of binary alphabet. This research was partially supported by FAPESP foundation (grant for international cooperation with USP). Computer simulation demonstrated high speed of encryption. In [12] authors evaluated the diameter of graph W (n, F q ) and proved that the family of these graphs W (n, q), n ≤ q is a family of small world graphs.
Professor Routo Terada (USP, Brasil) suggested to investigate the behaviour of these algorithms under linearization attacks. Computer simulation supports the conjecture on a good resistance of the encryption scheme to such attacks.
The idea of using graphs A(n, K) in cryptography was proposed by U. Romańczuk-Polubiec and V. Ustimenko in [45] . Evaluation of the order of encryption map based on A(n, q) was presented in [23] . A theoretical study of orders and cycles can be found in [44] , [45] .
Some stream ciphers defined via graphs D(n, K) were proposed by M. Polak and V. Ustymenko in [25] . Furthermore, M. Polak compared LDPC codes corresponding to A(n, K), D(n, K) and D(n, K) in [49] .
The importance of such graphs was justified in [44] . The encryption algorithm was implemented and some properties (speed, mixing properties, order) were investigated in the paper.
II. ON THE CLASS OF BIVARIATE GRAPHS
Let K be a commutative ring. We define T (n, K) as a bipartite graph with the set of vertices V (T ) = P ∪ L, P ∩ L = ∅. We call P = K n a set of points and L = K n a set of lines (two copies of a Cartesian power of K are used). We will use two types of brackets to distinguish points (p) ∈ P and lines [l] ∈ L:
) and we write:
, if the following relations between their coordinates hold:
where e 
In fact, the neighbour of a given point (p) is given by above equations, where parameters p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n are fixed elements of the ring and symbols l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n are variables. It is easy to see that if we set l 1 then this choice uniformly establishes values l 2 , l 3 . . . , l n . So each point has precisely k neighbours. In a similar way we observe that the neighbourhood of any line also contains k neighbours. Notice, that the order and degree of our graph defined via strings i s , j s , e Let us consider some examples.
Wenger graphs W (n, K)
In 1991 Wenger defined the family of bipartite, p-regular graphs H n (p), where p prime number [28] . In [26] Lazebnik and Ustimenko introduced straight forward generalization W (n, q) of these graphs via change of F p to F q , where q is a prime power. They used special Lie algebra and proved that the family of bipartite, q-regular graphs W (n, q), where q is prime power and n ≥ 2. Graphs W (n, q) are defined for all prime powers and H n (p) = W (n, p) are defined only for primes.
The set of vertices of infinite incidence structure (P, L, I) is V = P ∪ L and the set of edges E consists of all pairs
. Bipartite graphs W (n, q) have partition sets P n (collection of points) and L n (collection of lines) isomorphic to vector space F n q , where n ∈ N + . Let us use the following notations for points and lines in graph W (n, q): 
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The graphs W (n, F q ) have cycles of length 8. One can change finite field K for general commutative ring K and work with graph W (n, K).
Graphs A(n, K)
Graphs A(n, K), formally appearing as graphs E(n, K) in [43] , are used as tools for the study of D(n, K) properties. Later on the graphs E(n, K) were presented with another name as an independent family A(n, q) for the first time in [45] for cryptographic applications.
Let us use the following notations for points and lines in the graph A(n, K):
The point (p) is incident with the line [l], and we write (p)I A [l], if the following relations between their coordinates hold:
for 3 ≤ i ≤ n.
Graphs D(n, K)
The following interpretation of a family of graphs D(n, K) in case K = F q can be found in [27] . By I D we denote the incidence relation for this graph. Let us use the following notations for points and lines:
Two types of brackets allow us to distinguish points from lines. Points and lines are elements of two copies of the vector space over K. Point 
where
The set of vertices is V = P ∪ L and the set of edges E consists of all pairs {(p), [l]} for which (p)I D [l] . Bipartite graphs D(n, K) have partition sets P (collection of points) and L (collection of lines) isomorphic to vector space K n , where n ∈ N + .
Formal definitions for the family of graphs D(n, K) were presented in [25] .
Construction of projective limits graphs of D(n, K) appears in papers motivated by results on embeddings of Chevalley group geometries in the corresponding Lie algebras and construction of blow-up for an incidence system of Weyl groups in [46] , [47] . Moreover, this structure is the base for construction of family of graphs D(n, K) (see [25, 27] ).
Let us use the analogical notations for points and lines in graph D(K):
In the incidence structure (P,
Graphs from families D(n, K) and D(n, K) are bipartite, kregular, where |K| = k. The girth of graphs from the described families increases with the growth of n. In fact D(n, q) is a family of graphs of large girth and there is a conjecture that D(n, q) is another family of graphs of a large girth.
All graphs from the considered families are k-regular, bipartite and the set of vertices is V = P ∪ L, P ∩ L = ∅. They are sparse graphs.
It is clear that there is a natural homomorphism of T (n + 1, K) onto T (n, K) of "deleting the last coordinate" that sends (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , x n+1 ) to (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and [y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n , y n+1 ] to [y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ]. It means that there is a well defined projective limit T (K) of graphs T (n, K), n → ∞. Bivariate graphs form a special subclass of so called linguistic graphs for which natural projective limits are defined in a similar way.
Recall that the girth g = g(Γ) of the graph Γ is the length of its minimal cycle.
Let us assume that the girth g(n) of graphs T (n, K) is unbounded. The obvious inequality g(n + 1) ≥ g(n) holds. It means that projective limit T (K) has to be a |K|-regular forest. We have such situation in cases of graphs A(n, F q ) and D(n, F q ) If q ≥ 2 then A(F q ) is a single tree presented by the above equations. Graph D(F q ) is an infinite forest containing infinitely many trees.
Projective limit W (F q ) of Wenger graphs is an infinite connected graph containing cycles of length 8.
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III. GENERAL ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM We can convert graph T (n, K) to finite automaton in the following way.
and N α (v) be the operator of taking neighbor of vertex v where the first coordinate is α: v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , . . . , v n ) → [α, * , * , * , . . . , * ], v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , . . . , v n ] → (α, * , * , * , . . . , * ), where α ∈ K. The remaining coordinates can be determined uniquely using relations describing the chosen graph T (n, K).
We convert T (n, K) to finite automaton via joining v an N α (v) by directed arrow with weight α. We assume that all vertices of the graph are accepting states.
A bit more interesting object is a symbolic bivariate automaton. Let a(x) = (α 1 (x), α 2 (x), . . . , α s (x)) be a string of elements from K[x] (totality of polynomials in variable x with coefficients from K).
We introduce operator N s a(x) (v), where v is a point or a line with coordinates v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , of taking the last vertex u of the path v,
We refer to N s a(x) as a computation of the symbolic automaton with the string
. . , s and initial state
It is easy to see that the restriction of this map on P is a polynomial transformation of P = K n into P (parameter s is even) or L (parameter s is odd) of kind
. . .
Notice that generally F s is not a bijection. Let us consider an invertibility condition for F s . x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) = α s (x 1 ). Let p be some point from P n and F n (p) = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) (point or line). Then the equation α s (x 1 ) = c 1 has a unique solution η. So we can compute η 1 = α 1 (η),
We can compute the chain c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ), N ηs−1 (c) = c 1 , N ηs−2 (c 1 ) = c 2 , . . . , N η1 (c s−2 ) = c s−1 , N η ((c s−1 )) = c s = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) with η = p 1 . So F n is a bijection.
βs(x) . In this case invertibility of each β i (x), i = 1, 2, . . . , s guarantees the bijectivity of N s a(x) . We refer to such case as recurrently defined string.
Let L 1 and L 2 be sparse affine bijective transformation of the affine space (free module in other terminology)
where A = a i,j and C = c i,j are n × n matrices with a i,j , c i,j ∈ K. It is clear that
Let F n be a polynomial map of K n to itself. We refer to G n = τ L F n τ R as affine deformation of F n .
Symmetric algorithm
We can use the data on the graph T (n, K), the symbolic computation given by the string a = a(x) of polynomials α 1 (x), α 2 (x), . . . , α s (x), where α s (x) is a bijective map of K to itself and affine transformations L 1 and L 2 in the following encryption scheme.
Correspondents Alice and Bob agree on a private encryption key
and keep the key in secret. Messages are written using characters belonging to the alphabet K. So the plainspace is K n and its elements must be treated as points (or lines) of the graph. To encrypt they use the composition
Notice that the computation has to be executed in numerical level:
1) Correspondent Alice writes plaintext p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) and treats it as point of the bivariate graph. In the case of recurrently defined symbolic computation as above the encryption bijective map is
2) She computes parameters
As we already see, this encryption transformation is equivalent to (β 1 (x)))) ). Recurrently defined symbolic computation is an example of the polynomial map with an invertible decomposition in the sense of [31] . It has various applications in the development of multivariate key exchange protocols and asymmetric multivariate algorithm. The most popular case of implementation is related to graphs D(n, K) (see [1, 21] ) and A(n, K) (see [22, 23] ), where K is a finite field of arithmetical rings Z m and strings of kind
. . . , s − 2 are regular elements of the ring K. We refer to such case as shifting encryption.
Let us consider the case of strong symmetric encryption, when the function is α s (x) = ax+b, with a regular (invertible) element of K. In this case it is easy to show that degrees of encryption map F n and decryption map F n −1 are the same. The advantage of this case is its universality. One can implement it in case of arbitrary chosen finite ring K.
IV. ON THE PROPERTIES OF BIVARIATE GRAPH BASED BIJECTIVE ENCRYPTION MAPS
The girth G of simple graph G is the length of its shortest cycle. As it was established in [27] the girth of the graph D(n, F q ) is ≥ n + 5. So in the case of shifting encryption the map with the password x + d 1 , x + d 2 , . . . , x + d s , s < n + 5 the encryption map F n has no fixed points. So ciphertext is always different from the plaintext. Let us consider deformated shifting encryption of kind τ L F n τ R . We assume that affine maps τ L and τ R are fixed. Correspondents are able to change string d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d s for another one.
We assume that d i + d i+1 = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , s − 2. Such choice means that encryption map corresponds to the path of length s. The inequality g(D(n, q)) ≥ n + 5 implies that different strings of length s < (n+ 5)/2 produce different ciphertexts. So even in the case when τ L and τ R are known to adversary the complexity of attacks without an access to unencrypted information is bounded from below by q (n+5)/2 . In [44] these results were generalized for the case of general commutative ring K. Let M be a multiplicative subset of K, i. e. M is closed under the ring multiplication and it does not contain 0. We say that a string
It was proven that different M -regular strings of length s < (n + 5)/2 produce distinct ciphertexts from the same plaintext. So in the case of |K| = k, |M| = m the resistance to attacks without access to unencrypted data is bounded from below by mk (n+5)/2−1 .
It was proven that graphs A(n, F q ) form a family of graphs of increasing girth h(n) that tends to infinity as n grows. The speed of growth of h(n) needs further evaluation. In [44] it was proven that different |M|-regular strings of length s < n produce different encryption maps.
Results on |M|-regular strings of length restricted maps are obtained in terms of dynamical systems corresponding to graphs D(n, K) and A(n, K).
Let us assume that maps τ L and τ R are identities and consider the groups of transformations GD(n, K) and GA(n, K) generated by shifting encryption maps corresponding to strings of even length. In [40] was proven that all elements of GD(n, K) are cubical transformations of affine spaces P n and L n . Similar result for GA(n, K) is stated in [44] . As it follows instantly from this result transformation F ′ n = τ L F n τ R and its inverse are cubical transformations.
The cryptanalytic corollary of this statement is justification of linearization attacks on stream ciphers corresponding to stream ciphers based on graphs D(n, K) and A(n, K).
Let correspondents use the transformation F ′ n . The adversary has knowledge on the general scheme of open algorithm but not on the data for τ L and τ R and shifting string. So he knows about cubic nature of encryption. We assume that he has access to the unencrypted information and is able to intercept quite many pairs of kind (p, c), where p is plaintext and c corresponding ciphertext.
Then adversary writes G n which is a formal cubical map in standard form with the unknown coefficients in front of monomial terms. He or she is able to solve system of O(n 3 ) equations of kind G n (c) = p and restore the map G n . So adversary could control the communication channel. The complexity of such direct linearization attack is O(n 10 ).
V. ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GRAPH BASED STREAM CIPHER BASED ON NON BIJECTIVE MAPS
Let us describe an implemented algorithm, which can run in the case of arbitrary commutative ring K and arbitrary bivariate graph T (n, K). We slightly modify the above described symmetric algorithm based on bivariate graphs T (n, K) which is not a case of shifting encryption. Firstly, we take a symbolic computation for string a = a(x) = (α 1 (x), α 2 (x), . . . , α s (x)),
. , s where d is mutually prime with the order of K * . So equation
* has at most one solution. We take L 1 as an affine bijective transformation of kind x 2 , . . . , x n ), where l i are linear functions from K[x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ]. Correspondents will use the plainspace
They will use L 1 N s a(x) L 2 as encryption map. To execute computation in time O(n) they take finite parameter s and use loaded tables for α i (x), i = 1, 2, . . . , s (one dimensional arrays a i (x), x ∈ K * ). So they will compute 
To decrypt they will take c 0 = (c We can theoretically evaluate degrees of encryption d enc and decryption d dec . In cases of graphs D(n, K) and A(n, K), these parameters are bounded below by some constants depending from parameters α i , i = 1, 2, . . . , s. We can select string of parameters and get d dec large enough to make cryptoanalysis a difficult task. In case D(n, K) the degrees are even larger, they have size O(n). Notice that direct linearization attacks are formally impossible because the encryption map is not a bijective one.
The implementation of the algorithms in the present work was done using the Python programming language, in particular version 2.7. The code doesn't use any out-of-the-box libraries for facilitating operations with matrices. The tests for measuring the processing time have been executed on y 2 = (x 2 + x 0 · y 1 ) mod 256 10: if n ≥ 3 then if n ≥ 2 then 20:
x 2 = (y 2 − y 1 · x 0 ) mod 256 21: if n ≥ 3 then In the non-bijective case the plainspace is large subset of K n and the adversary has to restore the multivariate encryption transformation E and search for polynomial map E ′ such that EE ′ fixes each plaintext. Known methods do not allow to solve this task in polynomial time. Special case with high degree E ′ is implemented. Loaded tables for x d allow a fast for j = 2, 3, . . . , n do 
